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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

DEFINITIONS OF "VALUE" AND THE LOGIC OF VALUE JUDGMENTS

I

IT is an important insight, much emphasized of late, that the function of a sentence is not always disclosed by its form; and recent literature has stressed the fact that value judgments, that is, statements containing such words as "ought," "right," "good," and "beautiful" generally have an emotive-expressive aspect, and perhaps a directive-imperative function as well, in addition to their indicative or declarative function. Some writers appear so impressed by this discovery that they are led to deny that such judgments have any cognitive-theoretical content—an unfortunate tendency, since it produces in reaction an equally extreme view, that the emotive aspects are quite negligible, if present at all. In general, these formulations suffer from being in the categorical form, as if it were possible to lay down beforehand what is involved in such judgments, a decision which would be made possible only by turning such determinations into disguised expressions of definitions.

I wish to discuss the problem of the definition of "value," or value terms, in the context of value judgments in their genuinely declarative, cognitive aspect. Such a discussion admittedly and purposely abstracts from the full richness of actual discourse; but the latter can be comprehended and appreciated only if we are clear as to its constituents, of which the declarative aspect is not always the least important. Admitting then that a given value judgment, such as "this is good," is not as simple as it seems, that its analysis will generally involve imperative and exclamatory sentences ("prefer this!" "how good this is!"), as well as indicative, we turn our attention in what follows exclusively to the latter. The problem I wish to raise is: How *should* we define "value," or its cognate terms, admitting that one *may* do so as he pleases, and that one does so in a number of typical ways in ordinary discourse.

Now a statement of the form "We should do x," considered as a statement (it may also function directively and expressively) may normally be considered as either a categorical or a hypotheti-

cal imperative. But since in this discussion we seek a reason, that is, a sanction for defining "value" in one way rather than another, we may neglect the interpretation as a categorical imperative (since it by definition admits of no reasons), and attempt to give an analysis in terms of the interpretation as a hypothetical imperative. "We should do x" will then turn into a hypothetical of the form "if we desire y, then we must do x." Thus, if we can determine some end y which those who discuss values all accept as the purpose of their discussion, we can hope to show that we ought to do x, since, as we might also hope to show, it and only it leads to y.

Now discourse concerning values has many ends: knowledge, belief, action, exercise, amusement, and so on. I restrict this discussion to the first of these, and consider whether if we seek to learn which value judgments are true about actions or artifacts, social or artistic, we can settle any of the issues which concern how we ought to define value terms.

The first requirement will be, of course, that the definition be such that a statement in which the term occurs will be verifiable; for, clearly, nothing could be more stultifying in an attempt to verify statements about values (our assumed goal) than to seek to verify admittedly unverifiable statements. But this is not enough. We seek in discussions of values, as I assume, objective knowledge, that is, socially verifiable statements about values. For if this were not so there would be no sense to discussions about values. We discuss questions about values in order to learn from others, and to teach others, what is the truth about such matters. We seek objective knowledge; only on this assumption can we rationalize such discussions—a point familiar enough to have found expression in the ancient maxim: concerning matters of taste there are no disputes.

We may elucidate this point by distinguishing between subjective and objective propositions, the former being verified by the direct experience of a single person alone, as in questions of taste and preference; the latter, on the other hand, requiring for their verification reference to more than what a single person can find. And we can say that a definition of "value" must permit of the construction of socially verifiable, that is, objective propositions—at the risk of otherwise making senseless our disputes and discussions about values. Or, expressed in another way: we desire definition of "value" such that our questions regarding the value of objects, acts, or institutions can be given socially verifiable answers. To illustrate:

II

Suppose the question that confronts us is whether a certain work of art is a good work of art. Whether or not it is to be called "good" depends in part upon what we mean by the term "good," for until we have decided that question we can not sensibly undertake to see whether the qualities or relations designated by the term "good" do actually qualify or relate the object in question. Let us assume, therefore, that we have already agreed as to the meaning of the term "good"; let us suppose, following our uncriticized instincts (we *may* arrive at the same point after criticism) we agree that "good" means pleasing-to-me. (The argument holds regardless of the reference of "good," so long as it stands for some quality, experience, or relation or sequence of them, the existence of which is determinable by *one* individual alone.) The question then, in our example, whether a certain work of art is good is the question whether that object pleases me. Now this is easy to determine: I have merely to confront it and report the hedonic consequences. In so far as I am talking to myself, such a confrontation and report is conclusive, and there is nothing more to be said. But suppose *A* and *B* are discussing the problem of whether the work is good; they decide to investigate the matter and proceed to confront it. *A* reports that it pleases him, it is therefore good. *B*, on the other hand, also puts the question to the test and reports that it is not good, since it does not please him.

It is evident at once that here is some kind of apparent contradiction. For *A* says that the work is good, and *B* says it is not good; and it happens that both, in terms of the definition of "good," are right. Now, we should recognize that a definition of "good" which brings us so easily into apparent contradictions is not well constructed; for nothing can be more certain than the fact that this apparent contradiction will be the cause of a very great deal of real confusion. For, although *A* and *B* may occasionally recollect their definition of "good" which renders this contradiction merely apparent, still more often they will forget it and, misled by their definition, will be fortunate if they end their discussion in mere blows and do not do what is far worse, namely, never end it at all.

That such a definition of "good" leads to apparent contradictions is not the worst that can be said of it: it is so formulated that the disputants can not possibly come to any real agreement. For suppose them to agree verbally that the work in question is good; what is the nature of their agreement? Merely this: *A*

is pleased and *B* is pleased; but this is only a verbal agreement, since they are reporting of different subjects altogether. It would be a real agreement only if *A* said, "I am pleased," and *B* said of *A*, "Yes, he is pleased"; a real disagreement if *B* said of *A*, "No, he is not pleased." Where there is no possibility of real disagreement, there is no possibility of real agreement either. But we have assumed that our end is to formulate definitions so that the questions we ask permit of socially verifiable answers. Therefore the definition of "good" above is a poor one, for it does not enable us to formulate socially verifiable answers to such questions.

Akin to such a definition of "good," in terms of some immediately felt quality of pleasure, are those which take "good" to stand for some essence, some Platonic subsistent entity, absolute in status and normative in function—such a definition as takes "good" to stand for a value, not derivative from interest or liking, but a constituent element of a realm of "eternal values," related to human interest and approbation only to the extent of permitting of them, and bestowing grace upon those who recognize and worship them. Value "theories" of this sort, which generally stand in sharp opposition to those taking preference or pleasure as fundamental, have this element in common with them: they speak of values as, in some sense, objects knowable by immediate awareness or intuition, concerning the existence of which social debate, argument, and experiment are pointless. Either you are interested or you are not, either you are pleased or you are not, either you intuit this absolute value or you do not—in no case can there be grounds for rational discussion as to whether what interests, pleases, or reveals itself as a value is indeed such, in no case is there the possibility of finding some common ground of reconciliation for opposing judgments.

That such a definition of the term "good" or "value" can be made and sustained goes, of course, without saying. And if, adopting such a definition, anyone reports that certain objects, acts, or characters exhibit such values or goodness of the sort intended by the term, there can be no possible grounds of disagreement, and therefore no grounds of agreement. Just as *B*, who is not pleased upon confrontation with a certain object, can only say *he* is not pleased, and never that *A*, who is pleased by the act, is not so pleased; so here, if some one who has access to the hierarchy of absolute values reports to me that he intuits the pervasion of some act or object by some essential member of the hierarchy, I can not as a reasonable man, understanding the question at issue,

deny that he does; deny, that is, that the object as he may define "value" or "good" is valuable or good. I may tell him frankly that I have not the least notion of what he is talking about in predicating such value, but this statement is a confession of my ignorance, not a disproof of his predication.

The point here seems to me to be simply this: *defining "value" (or "good") in terms of something, whether quality, relation, or essence, natural or non-natural, concerning which one's immediate awareness or intuition or feeling is the final arbiter; defining "value" so that verification of value judgments is completely exhausted by such an individual experience or intuition, or series of them, is to define it so that no basis of rational agreement or disagreement is possible.*

How, then, granting our aim of asking only those questions of our fellowmen concerning which they have something to say in answer, granting, that is, our aim of defining "value" (or "good" or whatever be our concept) so that the questions formulated in terms of the concept can be answered by common investigation and agreement—how, then, I say, are we to go about doing this?

There are many specific ways of doing so, of defining "value" or "good" so that social agreement is possible and necessary in answer to our questions concerning it. The physical sciences furnish us with the best example of the method here required, and I shall take one of basic importance from that field.

III

As measurement is the basis of physical science, so spatio-temporal coincidence is the basis of measurement. The simplest act of measurement, the laying of a measuring rod on some object to be measured, is founded on the fact of observed coincidences of the points on the measuring rod and points on the object. This being so, how do we determine whether two points coincide? We do so by observation, of course; not by *simple* observation, however, but by *correlated* observations. As we know, two points may appear coincident to one observer without actually being physically, i.e., objectively, coincident. For a physical coincidence we must observe the points from all directions, and only if they are observed as, or are assumed to be, coincident from all directions do we assume them to be actually coincident. To this must be added the possibility of agreement as to tactual coincidences also, since visual and tactual perceptions do not always agree. But even though any given observer were to observe the points from all possible directions, this would not be sufficient if no other

observers of the "same" points found them or could find them to be coincident; for we do not accept reports as expressing physical relations unless they are, or can be if necessary, verified by any or all other competent observers.

Thus in the case of such a concept as that of the physical coincidence of two points, we see that it is defined not in terms of one immediately perceived datum, nor merely in terms of a complex correlation of visual and tactual data given to some one person, but rather in terms of actual or potential *general agreement by all competent observers* as to the existence of certain complexes of data and relations between them. It is not enough that *I* see two points as coincident from a certain direction, that *I* discover them to be visually coincident from all directions, nor enough that *I* find them tactually as well as visually coincident from all directions; it is further required that the same report be given by *all other competent observers* in order that it be taken as an objective fact, a physical truth, that the points are indeed coincident. (The well-known difficulties involved in defining "competence," or "the expert," need not detain us in this discussion.)

Only in terms of such a definition of "physical coincidence," which involves more than one person's findings, which involves the conformity of any other observer's relevant findings as well, are we able to formulate propositions regarding physical coincidence concerning which social verification is possible—concerning which, therefore, scientific objectivity can be attained. It is because of this fact, this type of inter-subjective formulation of the meaning and verification of concepts and propositions of physical science, that such science is more than autobiography, more than a series of statements: "I, so and so, at time *t*, experienced such and such." Only because of objective formulations of this sort can one scientist check the work of another, can frauds be discovered, mistakes detected, and final agreement reached.

IV

Applying these considerations to value judgments, we see that what is required, if we are to attain the degree of objectivity which is the condition of discourse (as opposed to talking to oneself) and of the possibility of settling disputes concerning value judgments, is a definition of "value" which is not reducible to the form: "what pleases me," "has such and such an intuited quality," or anything of the sort whose existence can be determined by one person alone, without reference to the experience or findings of anyone else.

We must, if our aim is to make sense of discourse and argument about values, so define "value" that any value judgment for its verification will require reference to more than the experiences of one individual; will enable any particular individual to consider his own likes and dislikes, intuitions or absence of them, as at best only partial evidence for the existence of a value; will, that is, enable and require him to establish some kind of social agreement as the criterion of the existence of the value—so that what someone else says or experiences has some bearing on whether what appears valuable really is so. Otherwise what anyone else has to say about the value is simply irrelevant; for if value is *directly and completely* reported in any subject's experience, what anyone else says *is* irrelevant, and therefore there is nothing to be said between men on the subject of values.

Just what specific formulation of the value concept will best meet the dual end of at once conforming fairly closely to prevailing value judgments and also making social verification of such judgments possible, I shall not undertake to decide. In the last analysis, what a term will generally mean in a given society is determined by how the majority of speakers or the determining minority use the term, and at any period in any given society a prevailing meaning may or may not have made its appearance. This possibility of confusion, this unfortunate actual confusion, confronts us in the case of definitions of "value." I shall not, therefore, pretend that I can give a completely satisfactory definition of "value" even for those who agree with what has been said about its desirable properties, but shall be content to show how one definition, of the many possible, meets the demands described above. To illustrate the *sort* of definition of "value" required by this analysis, I shall take the familiar one which defines "value" as what pleases most men most of the time.

V

Suppose we are again faced by the question: Is a certain act or object valuable or good?, and that we have agreed to accept the above definition of "value." Our problem then is the problem of determining whether and to what extent the contemplations or consequences of it are pleasant to the community. (Let us suppose now that the judgment is one regarding the pleasure value of an act or institution—that we are concerned with an ethical question.)

We may begin with an inspection of our own response to the act, with a determination of whether it pleases us at any moment.

What any individual reports as his experience thus has *some* bearing on the final judgment, but is no more determinative of the truth of the judgment than is the perceived coincidence of two points by a given observer at a given moment determinative of the truth of the judgment that the two points are physically coincident.

Having thus determined whether the act does at any moment please us, the next step is to determine whether it always or at least in most cases continues to do so. For just as we recognized the relevance of a certain inter-subjective *correlation* of perceived coincidences to the truth of the judgment that the points are physically coincident, so here we must recognize the relevance, to the truth of the judgment that the act is really pleasant, of a whole series of correlated experiences of pleasure. Otherwise we could not distinguish between a momentary flash of pleasure followed by unmitigated aversion, and prevailing pleasure in the experience of the act. As a man might make a mistake in judging that he finds two points coincident, a mistake he is able to rectify by reference to future experiences, so here a man might make a mistake in judging that the act pleases him (not that it does at some moment, but that it generally does) and by reference to past and future experiences correct his error.

Having made such a generalization based on experiments to determine our own prevailing reaction to the act, we can now proceed to determine whether the response is general. We decide, then, who is to be included in the moral community (which has as its membership all those who have a common definition of "the moral good") and proceed to a survey of how the act affects them. In determining whether other persons are pleased by a certain act we should have to take a number of facts into account, the complete enumeration of which might be difficult; but in practice the signs of pleasure and well-being in others are fairly easy to recognize. (The question of how to *interpret* propositions about other persons' feelings must be distinguished from the problem of their truth.) On the basis of their statements and certain types of their non-verbal behavior and appearance we could, and do, form a judgment of the hedonic consequences of the act for them, a judgment not merely of its consequences at a given moment but over a long period of time or in general. And in certain cases we would be able without much difficulty to agree that acts of definite types are uniformly pleasing to most men. We should be, and are, able to formulate objective generalizations regarding the pleasure-value not only of acts and objects, but even of vast social structures and institutions.

We can, for instance, assert with a very high degree of probability that excessive drinking is bad, despite the temporary pleasure the act might produce in the alcoholic; for the pain his drinking would bring him, his friends, family, and state, as a result of his degradation and their shame and trouble would far outweigh the pleasure. Similarly beyond question war is bad,[1] despite the undoubted pleasure its contemplation might bring to the sadist or its proceeds to a munitions maker. We should find general agreement for this proposition, because the painful consequences, direct and indirect, are so great and widespread as to be beyond calculation, while but few individuals approve of it or find it pleasant at all, and those who might delight in it at any moment would in all probability not find that it or its consequences continued to please them over a lifetime in which its endless horrors manifested themselves.

Our knowledge of psychology, physiology, economics, and history gives us adequate generalizations on which to base highly probable judgments regarding the pleasure-value of a large number of acts and institutions, judgments which enable us to make objective value-judgments of a probability equal in many cases to that of any but the most certain propositions of natural science.

We already possess a large body of such propositions, and we need only recognize the fact and apply our definition of "value" to these cases to settle at once beyond the likelihood of further dispute a number of arguments about values that still take place. And in those cases in which we do not possess such knowledge, we at least possess the intellectual tools which, correctly used, will enable us to settle the questions in so far as they can be settled, and which, in those cases in which the question can not be settled, will at least indicate clearly that, and to what extent, this is so.

To know that we have no true generalization regarding the pleasure-value of certain objects, acts, or institutions is to possess knowledge which will tell us when to give up the quest for truth and turn to its creation. Thus it is that ethics in its cognitive aspect is concerned with the discovery of the laws governing ethical behavior and with the discovery of what is good; but man's task is not only to know the good, but also to create it. When we know that there is no prevailing hedonic reaction to certain acts or institutions, when we know that opinion is more or less evenly divided as to the pleasure-value of such acts and institutions, we do not rest content with this knowledge, but in many cases strive to educate men to react to these acts and institutions with the same feel-

[1] This is not to deny that it may be and no doubt frequently is a lesser evil, and thus to be preferred, if the alternatives are greater evils.

ings we ourselves do—we impose sanctions and alter the course of causal sequences in order to bring about that degree of social agreement, which, whatever be its dangers, is the condition of a healthy moral community and a happy society. And the same is true in the domain of esthetic values.

Thus we see that a definition of "value" in terms of a preponderance of pleasure does enable us to meet the requirements set forth earlier, of making sense of discussions of values; does enable us to transcend the subjectivity of our experiences of pleasure or intuitions of value and arrive at that objectivity which is the condition of science, moral and esthetic as well as physical.

VI

As has, I hope, become clear, my criticism has not been directed against any particular definition of "value," but against certain types of definition, namely, against all forms of subjectivism (in the sense made clear in the earlier sections of this paper dealing with subjective propositions).

Now since we are acquainted with objects only directly, immediately; since, that is, all contact with reality is through the immediate confrontation of data, whether relating to nature or to values, the question may well arise whether in banishing subjectivity I have not banished all content and meaning from value predicates. Had I done so, I am convinced I should have been guilty of a gross misapprehension of the nature of knowledge, and of our means of gaining access to the world and the values that lie within it. As the reader will have observed, after criticizing subjective formulations of the notion of "value," I nevertheless reintroduced subjectivity in the form of feelings of pleasure. I pointed out that a feeling of pleasure or preference is not sufficient to verify a value judgment, yet in the end, to be sure, only as an illustration, I defined "value" in terms of what is pleasant for most men most of the time. Have I, in doing so, refuted myself?

I think not. My aim has been to make possible objectivity in value judgments. But to attain objectivity is not equivalent to the unconditioned rejection of subjectivity; it is rather, since to the observer data are in themselves neither subjective nor objective, to discern some order among the data by which the notion of objectivity, as distinguished from subjectivity, is constituted. We can call a fact truly objective only when the object which we experience is, as we say, common to many persons, or can become so. Thus in my discussion of the notion of physical coincidence I pointed out, in effect, that nothing in the data themselves indi-

cated whether they were subjective or objective, that this could be determined only by reference to what other observers experienced in given situations. Objectivity, thus, is a category of the second order, expressing a certain order among the data, among elements immediately experienced.

Thus we may conceive a physical object as a logical construct: propositions expressing the existence and properties of physical objects are functions of propositions expressing the actual and possible experiences of certain data by individuals perceptually related to certain points in time and space. That is, we confirm the existence of a physical object by the verification of propositions stating, in effect, that persons who act in certain ways in certain locations find data of certain specified kinds. Since the existence of the physical object is confirmed in terms of the existence of data of certain kinds which any normal persons acting in certain ways would find, the truth of the proposition that such an object exists depends upon the truth of the proposition that such data will be found; and if such data are not found, it follows, in the usual interpretation, that the object does not exist, that the proposition asserting the existence of the object is false.

Let us apply this type of analysis to the relation of data, such as feelings of pleasure, to the existence of values. Since our aim is to formulate a concept of "value" which will make social verification of value judgments possible, it must be so defined that the experience of data, say, of pleasure, by *different* persons is required to determine the truth of propositions asserting that objects or acts are valuable. The proposition that a certain act is valuable is then to be conceived, in terms of our example, as a function of certain propositions of the form (let us say): "this pleases me"; but a function of such propositions, not as they express the finding of such data by one observer only, but by all or most men of a moral community.

Our definition of "value," then, is also based on data, on the immediate in experience—in the example given earlier, on data of pleasure. It therefore differs from the definition in terms of what-pleases-me, not in having nothing to do with feelings of pleasure, but, if one may say so, in having much more to do with them; since we defined "value" as what pleases most men most of the time. That these formulations, even though both based on feelings of pleasure, are yet quite different is clearly indicated by the fact that they are logically independent; that is, an act may please me, yet not be valuable, namely, if it does not also please most men; and an act may be valuable, i.e., please most men most of the time, without pleasing me. Since this is unquestion-

ably so, it will not do to ignore as negligible the difference between these formulations, both admittedly based on feelings of pleasure.

In conclusion: The particular form of a satisfactory definition of "value" does not especially interest me in this paper; for I am concerned with its logical properties, which may be common to a variety of particular forms. In any case, there is little reason to believe that there is one satisfactory all-inclusive definition of "value"; the concepts of moral and esthetic value *may* be irreducible to one another or to some third concept. If this is the case, it is foolish to insist that one concept serve for all occasions. But this possible difference in the meaning of "value" can not be made a justification for ignoring the properties which any definition of "value" must have which makes objective judgments of value possible. If this paper has made clear at least certain requirements of such a definition, it has served its purpose.

DAVID RYNIN

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
BERKELEY

THE MORAL SITUATION: A FIELD THEORY OF ETHICS

FIELD theory, originally developed by Faraday to account for certain physical phenomena, has since been applied to fields of investigation far removed from physics. Gurwitsch,[1] Spemann,[2] and others[3] have applied the field concept to biology; Lundberg,[4] J. F. Brown,[5] and others have applied it to sociology; Lewin[6] and others[7] have applied it to psychology. In the process, the concept "field" has undergone significant changes; it is used today not only in the sense in which it was originally proposed, as descriptive of concretely observable bi-polar phenomena occurring in space and

[1] "Ueber den Begriff des embryonalen Feldes," *Arch. Entw.-mechan.*, Vol. 51 (1922), pp. 383–415; "Weiterbildung und Verallgemeinerung des Feldbegriffs," *Roux' Arch.*, Vol. 112 (1927), pp. 433–454.

[2] *Embryonic Development and Induction*, New Haven, Conn., 1938.

[3] See the literature given by Spemann, section XV, pp. 297 ff.

[4] *Foundations of Sociology*, New York, 1939.

[5] *Psychology and the Social Order*, New York, 1936.

[6] *Principles of Topological Psychology*, New York, 1936.

[7] Sickles, W., "Experimental Evidence for the Electrical Character of Visual Fields Derived from a Quantitative Analysis of the Ponzo Illusion," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, Vol. 30 (1942), No. 1; Murphy, Gardner, *Personality*, New York, 1947, chs. 38, 39; Koffka, K., *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, New York, 1935, and other authors of the Gestalt school, in particular Koehler, W., *Gestalt Psychology*, New York, 1935, pp. 324 ff., *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, New York, 1938, pp. 334 ff.; Ellis, W. D., *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, London, 1938.

time—such as magnetic and gravitational fields in physics or, in a later extension, "situations" in sociology, but also in a more abstract methodological sense, as denoting an ordering concept applied to any manifold of phenomena, whether actually observable or not. In the latter sense the term "field" is, if not synonymous with, at least closely related to, the terms "geometry" (in the widest sense of the word), "frame of reference," and "science." "Fields" may thus exist either in space-time or in the dimension of thought, or in both.

Our question is whether the two field concepts, the narrower or descriptive and the wider or methodological, can be applied to, and in, ethics. Application of the wider term would be application of the field concept *to* ethics and would constitute ethics as a frame of reference for certain particular phenomena, or as "the ethical field." Application of the narrower term would be the application of the field concept *within* ethics and would constitute the particular phenomena which are the subject-matter of ethics, the "moral fields" or "moral situations." The terms "moral" and "ethical" will be used with reference respectively to the particular situations and the discipline of ethics. Let us first see in which way ethics as a discipline can be regarded as a "field," and in which way the field of ethics can be distinguished from the fields of the sciences, and let us then investigate the field character of the particular moral situations.

By a field is understood a state of energy tension existing between two—or more—poles. Scientific inquiry, as Dewey has shown, is problem-solving in situations. Situations have been compared by Dewey to physical fields.[8] Situations of inquiry are states of energy tension existing between two poles. The energy is the mental energy of the scientist who is endeavoring to solve the problem. The solution of each problem is a resolution of tension[9] between the situational state that is and the situational state that is to be. The two poles of a problematic situation are a real and an ideal pole; the problematic situation itself is an ideal-real field. The totality of such fields or situations constitutes the science as a whole.

Dewey's point of view of science as growing out of situational inquiry is widely held today. Thus Lundberg, following Dewey,[10] begins his chapter on "Frames of Reference in Sociology" with the observation that "the definition of a situation" is our focus of

[8] *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., Evanston, 1939, p. 544; Dewey, J., *Logic*, New York, 1938, pp. 66 f., 123.

[9] Dewey, J., *Logic*, p. 176.

[10] Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

attention to the situation [11] and is determined "by the *tensions* (adjustment needs) of the organism" [12] which in its turn "determines the categories in terms of which we report our experience." [13] The tensions of a scientific situation are "intellectual tensions" which are released or consummated when we consider the situation explained.[14]

Since "the segregation of a field is always with reference to a problem on the part of the investigator rather than on the basis of assumed 'natural' fields of data given in the universe," [15] it would be absurd to consider the contents of a science apart from the persons of the scientists,[16] or to consider the "objectivity" of such fields as "naturally given." [17]

Werkmeister, in his *Philosophy of Science*,[18] maintains that all science grows out of "first-person experience" and *is* that experience as ordered by concepts.[19] There is no "naturally given" reality which can be "explained" as existing in separation from the scientist. The cognitive situation is a "bipolar . . . complexity, the reality of which is centered in a 'knower' and a 'known.' Yet neither the 'knower' nor the 'known' *as such* has any reality outside the bipolar complexity referred to as 'experience.'" [20] The "intellectual tension" of which Dewey and Lundberg speak is with Werkmeister the tension between "the data of observation" and "our own assumptions, postulates and concepts defining 'ideal cases.'" [21] It is again a tension between concrete reality and the ideality of mental concepts.[22] The chaos of experience is being ordered by being subjected to the tension of the ideal-real field of science.[23] This order does not confine itself to the experience and

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 89. Cf. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, New York, 1911, pp. 11 f.

[12] Lundberg, *ibid.* Italics mine.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Cf. Schilpp, Paul A., "On the Probabilities and Limitations of Natural Science," *College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 3, 1934, pp. 29, 41 f.

[17] Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Also cf. pp. 125 f., the comparison between Gibbs' phase system and Pareto's social system.

[18] New York, 1940, *passim*.

[19] *Op. cit.*, p. 515.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 525.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 519. Cf. p. 102 ("acts of 'intentional reference'").

[23] Organization is the function of any field. It would be instructive to compare the ordering function of the field of science with the ordering function of a physical energy field. The chaos of molecular motion, for example, can be subjected to the ordering influence of field tension. In the Curie ex-

to the "objects" at hand, but spreads beyond them into a pattern which tends to embrace all objects and all experience.[24] The "subjectivity" of individual experience gradually gives place to the "objectivity" of all experience. There is, then, no longer any fundamental difference between subjectivity and objectivity. The more data the concept, the "rule of integration"[25] for every experience, is capable of ordering, the more "objective" will be the nature of the concept. In experience itself, embracing as it does both "object" and "subject," the terms "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are "meaningless."[26] Experience is an interaction between the "objects" and the mind, and the concepts, far from being mere "copies" of the "given objects," are the very energies—the ideal energies, that is to say[27]—which constitute the objects. Once we split up experience into subjective and objective we recognize that it is the *ideal* pole, the concept, which is responsible for the objectivation of experience in science.[28]

This conception of science as a field paves the way to a field theory of ethics.

The sciences do not take into consideration the act of *setting up* the frames of reference; a phenomenal field is part of a science when the frame of reference *is* established; how it is *being* established is not part of the science—although it ought to be, just as the act of conception ought to be part of the child. The ideal-real fields of the sciences are existent fields dealing with phenomena as they actually appear according to the established laws of the particular science. There ought to be a discipline, however, which is concerned with the sciences not as ready-made structures but in the making; which considers the fields not as ready-made frames of reference but as becoming structures—as potential frames of

periment of magnetization of oxygen gas the field counteracts the disorderly heat motion of the molecules and the magnetization can be increased by lowering the temperature.

[24] Werkmeister, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

[26] "As far as our immediate experience is concerned, the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' is meaningless; for whatsoever we may be aware of at any given moment 'is' *now* and 'is' always in precisely the same way, namely, as content of our first-person experience. The distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' emerges as the product of critical reflection" (*op. cit.*, p. 105).

[27] By "ideal energy" we mean a non-physical anti-entropic energy, such as is peculiar to life and, maybe, the life of reason. Cf. Johnstone, *The Philosophy of Biology*, Cambridge, 1917, pp. 82, 310–340; McDougall, *Body and Mind*, London, 1938, p. 245; Schrödinger, *What is Life?*, Cambridge, 1944, pp. 68 ff. Also Jeans, *The New Background of Science*, Cambridge, 1934, p. 278; Trueblood, *The Logic of Belief*, New York, 1942, pp. 158 f.

[28] Cf. Werkmeister, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

reference. Such a discipline would describe phenomena and situations not as they actually do appear but as they potentially ought to appear according to various frames of reference. This discipline would be concerned not with the setting of phenomena *in* the frames, but with their setting *into* the frames. Such, precisely, is the discipline of ethics.

Any situation becomes ethical as soon as the question of its setting and of its "appropriate" frame of reference arises. Ethics thus becomes a mode of intellectual procedure [29]—that mode, namely, which determines the frame of reference in which phenomenal human situations are to belong. It is the mode of positing such situations into the "fitting" frame of reference, the fittingness being determined by the purpose or potentiality of the situation in question.[30] Setting into a fitting frame of reference leads to the development of the situation, setting into an unfitting frame of reference leads to the situation's decay. The former is an ethical application of a frame of reference, the latter is an unethical application; the former makes the situation moral, the latter makes it immoral. All the various kinds of "good" and "evil" can be explained by this ethics of fittingness: evil, whatever it may be in the concrete case, is the application of an unfitting frame of reference to a situation; [31] good, whatever it may be in the concrete

[29] Cf. Cabot, E. L., *Everyday Ethics*, New York, 1906, p. 9: "Ethics is one point of view from which to look at everything in the world, and science, art, and law are other points of view."

[30] "Goodness is fitness and fitness for a purpose. . . . Things are good when they are fitted for the purpose for which they were meant. . . . Goodness means fitness whether we apply the word to the goodness of man or to the goodness of anything. . . . Anything is good when fitted for the purpose held in mind and bad when not so fitted" (Cabot, E. L., *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 365, 52). Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Introduction to Part IV: "If a man has proposed to do a thing and has accomplished it, he calls it perfect, and not only he but every one else who has really known . . . the mind and intention of the author of that work will call it perfect too." Cf. Spinoza's example of the house and of music (*ibid.*). Also Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, Cambridge, Mass., 1934, Vol. II, pp. 233 ff., with references to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[31] The supremely unethical would be the confusion of the ethical and the scientific frameworks themselves, as occurs, for example, when human beings are used as guinea pigs or dealt with as though they were merely possessors of raw materials which may be utilized, as bones crushed for use as fertilizers. The larger the difference of the frameworks the larger the crime. A particularly hideous crime would be using the creation of life as means of death—a crime professionally committed by the German SS-woman, Irma Greese.

A lesser but illustrative example of confusion of frameworks is that of the German court which "denazified" a former Gestapo agent for having refused to blow up a refugee transport, but prohibited him any official activity, for having disobeyed an order.

case, is the application of a fitting frame of reference to a situation. The notion of "fittingness" is the common denominator to the various kinds of good and evil.

The question of determining the fitting frame of reference relates to the ideal or "theoretical" pole of the field; the question of the actual concrete setting of the situation into the framework determined relates to the real or "practical" pole. The setting up of an idea as potential frame of reference for a situation and the application in action of that framework to the situation, taken together, constitute *the ideal-real field of a moral situation.* The totality of such fields constitutes *the ideal-real field of ethics.*

A moral situation is identical with the ethical field if it contains the moral universe as a whole. A person for whom the universe as a whole is a moral experience is called a mystic, especially in the Bergsonian sense of the word.[32] The mystic comprises all humanity as his moral situation; for him moral situation and ethical field are identical. For the average person the moral situation is a *section* of the ethical field of all humanity.

Being such a section the moral situation must be interpreted in the same way as was the ethical field, namely, as a state of energy tension between two—or more—poles. The field analysis of the moral situation is the second part of our program. We shall now investigate the question whether field theory can be applied *within* ethics.

If the moral situation is to be a section of the ethical field it must be "a section" of the study which investigates it. The relationship of ethics as the "ethical field" to the moral situation as a section of this field is different from the relation of the sciences as "fields" to the scientific phenomena. The difference shows up the characteristic distinction between the subject-matter of the sciences and that of ethics.

Both the sciences and ethics are ideal-real fields, but different with respect to their emphasis on, respectively, the "real" and the "ideal" pole of the field, the actual and the potential field content. Being ideal-real fields, both the sciences and ethics are domains whose energy tensions exist between the pole of the phenomena observed on the one hand, and the ideal pole of the observing and anticipating mind on the other. In the sciences the phenomena observed are themselves fields, but fields with two real poles, like the electric and gravitational fields in physics, or the genetic and embryonic fields in biology. These fields can be observed. Even the situational field in sociology can be observed and its two poles

[32] Whether or not such a person can actually exist is in this connection immaterial. If he could not exist we would have to invent him for our theory.

noted, the person on the one side, and the environment on the other. Scientific fields exist in space and time. What goes on in the fields observed is different in kind from what goes on in the field of the observer. The field of the observer is the ideal-real field between the spatio-temporal field observed and the observer's own mind. The mind, in observing what goes on in space-time, in anticipating the next move and in framing hypotheses, is not active in space and time in the same sense as are the phenomena observed. The mind projects these phenomena into its own mental space and, more significantly, into its own mental time. Anticipation is a process of projecting the phenomena, observed in space-time, into a future which exists only in the mind of the inquirer.

> Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities; and when responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to actualization of some of the potentialities rather than others, in a final existential situation.[33]

That "final existential situation" does not exist yet in reality, but merely in the mind of the inquirer. But, as we have seen, the person of the scientist belongs to the science as much as do the phenomena he observes. The real-ideal field of the sciences must therefore be pictured as a field in at least five dimensions, namely, the four dimensions of the phenomena observed, and the dimension of inquiry itself.[34] The latter is mainly a relation between the inquiring mind and the phenomenon's future, the latter coinciding with the future of the mind itself, for longer or shorter periods, and sometimes transcending it.[35] The phenomenon's future exists, at the moment of inquiry, as much in the inquiring mind as does the phenomenon's present *as object of inquiry*. "An object, in other words, is a set of qualities treated as *potentialities* for specified existential consequences."[36] The phenomenon's present and future are insolubly intertwined. But if we dissolve the connection for purposes of analysis we find that the phenomenon's present is *the subject-matter* of the science, whereas its future is part of *the science itself*, its laws and hypotheses. In other words, the real pole of the real-ideal scientific field refers to the present of the scientific subject-matter and the ideal pole refers to its future. Since most phenomena do not "have a future," but only repeat themselves in nature, their "future" is identical with their present

[33] Dewey, John, *Logic*, p. 107.

[34] Cf. Pitkin, Walter B., "Some Realistic Implications of Biology," in *The New Realism*, pp. 453 ff.

[35] As, for example, when a celestial body is the object of observation.

[36] Dewey, *Logic*, p. 129.

and the *difference* between the real and the ideal pole of the scientific field is of little scientific importance. Indeed, scientific "prediction" is based, in most cases, on the homogeneity of the phenomena's activity, and the aim of science is the reduction of the phenomenal activities to such homogeneity that precise prediction becomes possible. Although a great amount of creative effort is needed for the formulation of such laws—and the ideal pole therefore is extremely important—the ideality seems to merge into the reality of the phenomenon in exact proportion to the precision and correctness of the hypothesis on which the prediction was based.[37]

Only such subject-matter can be called "a section" of the ideal-real discipline investigating it, which in its own nature is not merely a spatio-temporal field, but *itself* an ideal-real field. Such, precisely, is the nature of the subject-matter of ethics, the "field" of the moral situation.

The moral situation as the ethical field in the narrower sense is fundamentally different from the *scientific* fields in the narrower sense. It is an ideal-real field of creativity, precisely as is the ethicist's—and the scientist's—own field. Its one pole is the pole of the given present, its other pole is that of the anticipated future. The subject-matter of ethics is therefore of the same nature as the discipline of ethics itself.

This relationship between ethical field and moral situation has several implications. The ideal-real field of ethics has, like the ideal-real field of science, a real and an ideal pole. But, whereas the real pole of the sciences is the entire field of the phenomenon, the real pole of ethics is only one of the poles of the situational field, namely, its real pole, that is to say, the situation as it is. The situation as it is, however, is *not* the moral situation—it is the *social* situation. The moral situation is the situation as it is *plus* the situation as it ought to be—the latter existing as an anticipation in the moral consciousness of the situational agent. Thus, whereas the scientist looks down, so to speak, on a spatio-temporal field which does not reach up into his own sphere of mental anticipation, the ethicist can not look *down* on a moral situation, but that situation reaches up to his own sphere of mental anticipation. The consciousness of the moral agent is—in so far and inasmuch as he is a *moral* agent—coextensive in his situation with the consciousness of the ethicist. We all are ethicists in our situations, if we act as moral agents in them. The difference between the ethicist examining a

[37] Cf. Kierkegaard, Sören, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Princeton, 1944, p. 289: "Precisely in the degree to which I understand a thinker I become indifferent to his reality, that is, to his existence as a particular individual."

moral situation and the moral agent within that situation lies not in the ideal pole but in the real pole of the situation. The moral agent *in* the situation can not content himself with analyzing his situation, but must transform the situation actively into the ideal future which he anticipates. The ethicist, in analyzing a moral situation of which he is not a part, may content himself with setting the ideal future and leave the transformation of the situation up to the moral agent in it. However, in his own situations the ethicist must be a moral agent, just as the moral agent must be, to a certain degree, an ethicist.

A situation which is to develop must be in harmony with and "a section of" the ethical field. Such situations alone can be the material bases of a man's moral life.[38] In the moral situation—that is, in the social situation as potential for further development—we have the locus of morality in our everyday action.[39]

Situational analysis can be applied to concrete ethical problems such as the problem of moral freedom,[40] the autonomy of the will,[41] and moral leadership.[42] A re-interpretation of ethics in terms of field theory may either start with Kant's critical philosophy or with Dewey's situational interpretation of Kant's theory. The present paper takes the latter point of departure. The former would lead to a "Critique of Valuation" which would establish value as a mode of anticipation in analogy to Kant's treatment of space and time and of the categories, as modes of perception and of conception respectively.

ROBERT S. HARTMAN

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

REPLY TO MR. BERENDA'S COMMENTS ON "METAPHYSICS AS HYPOTHESIS"[1]

In Mr. Carlton Berenda's "Comments" on my article "Metaphysics as Hypothesis,"[2] he seems to be in agreement as to the nature of hypothetical knowledge, but apparently is not willing to

[38] Hartmann, Nicolai, *Ethics*, New York, 1932, Vol. II, p. 158.

[39] Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. II, p. 158. Cf. Lee, Otis, "Value and the Situation," this JOURNAL, Vol. XLI (1944), p. 342.

[40] Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. III, pp. 37 ff.

[41] Hartmann, *ibid.*, and Vol. II, pp. 358 ff., a situational interpretation of Kant's categorical imperative.

[42] Hartmann, *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 96 ff.; J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, p. 338.

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. XLV (1948), pp. 103–105.

[2] This JOURNAL, Vol. XLIV (1947), pp. 344–352.

apply the term "knowledge," however qualified, to metaphysics. His reason for this appears to be that he is not willing to use the term "verification" in any sense except that in which physical theories are verified. This seems to be an initial assumption on his part.

I am not willing to accept this assumption *a priori*, and the *a posteriori* evidence for it does not convince me. I admit, of course, that physical hypotheses must be subjected to experimental physical verification. I did not say, and I do not believe, that metaphysics "interprets and criticizes observational verifications as used in the natural sciences." It is the business of natural science to attend to its own observational verifying, and it is not the place of metaphysics to meddle.

I did say, however, that the business of metaphysics is with the categories, and when the categorial activity is under consideration, any criticism is philosophical criticism although it be carried on by a practicing scientist. Physical reality is a category. It is a metaphysical category within which the natural scientist works. Mr. Berenda's "Comments" seem to add up to the position that scientific knowledge can be obtained only within this category. Such a position is a metaphysical and epistemological proposition that should itself be considered as a hypothesis and in need of verification. If the only verification possible is by physical methods, then it can not be established at all, for any attempt to establish it would involve a *petitio principii*.

It would be the height of presumption on my part to say that I had worked out the methods of verification of metaphysical hypotheses. It has taken hundreds of years to work out acceptable methods of verification for the hypotheses of natural science, and the newer sciences (including the social sciences) are still struggling with the problem. I have no expectation and little hope that metaphysics will be any more summarily successful.

I shall leave it to Mr. Miller to say whether he meant his concept of "interphenomena" to be pictorial. I did not take it to be so; in fact, it did not occur to me until Mr. Berenda suggested it. Whether or not a pictorial representation has heuristic value is beside the point. Perhaps "a wave-corpuscle is beyond conceptual imagery." (Should not the adjective be "perceptual" instead of "conceptual"?) But I should hesitate before agreeing that we should "define an electron as a set of equations involving certain experimentally determinable constants." The set of equations is a mathematical reality (except in so far as they are spoken or written, and then it is only the symbols that have physical reality). But the addition of the phrase "involving certain experimentally

determinable constants'' establishes the equations as describing a physical reality. Thus, the electron *is* not the set of equations, but is described by them. We have no adequate pictorial representation of what an electron is, and we probably do not need one. It may be called in question whether the ''picture'' of the solar system as a series of spheres revolving around a central sphere is adequate or can be established, and it is probably not necessary to astronomy either, no matter how necessary it may be in an elementary class in astronomy.

As I take it, all that Mr. Miller says is that the electron *is* a physical reality, whether or not we can picture it and whether or not that picture (if we can form it) has a heuristic value. This is a metaphysical proposition. As Mr. Aldrich brings out in his article in the same issue of this JOURNAL as Mr. Berenda's ''Comments,'' the pictorial function of language (and so of concepts) is not the same as its cognitive function even though the two can not be concretely divorced. In scientific knowledge, and in metaphysical knowledge as well, we are primarily concerned with the cognitive function of language.

Whether or not I am ''in the swim with the logical positivists'' is of little moment. The thesis that there can be no scientific knowledge except what can be experimentally verified is a thesis for the logical positivists to establish. For my part, I am inclined to think that the thesis that metaphysical hypotheses may be subject to verification is itself a hypothesis worthy of examination.

HAROLD N. LEE

NEWCOMB COLLEGE, TULANE UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEW

G. G. F. Hegel. GUIDO DE RUGGIERO. (Storia della filosofia: Parte quarta, La filosofia moderna, n. 5.) Bari: Laterza. 1948. 299 pp. 800 lire.

With this fifth volume of the fourth part of his history of philosophy Professor De Ruggiero (University of Rome), who is certainly the most authoritative historian of philosophy now living in Italy, concludes his *magnum opus,* begun more than a quarter of a century ago with the publication of the rather amateurish first version of his history of contemporary philosophy. Written by a representative of the Hegelian-Crocian school the book represents in a sense the actual position of Italian idealism as to its legitimate ancestor. Nor does the book betray our legitimate expectations. Pregnantly written, using in full the enormous bibliography on the

subject, it gives a very clear account of one of the most discussed thinkers of modern times, whose influence on contemporary culture and history has proved dominant. Even the definite allegiance of Professor De Ruggiero to a particular kind of Hegelianism (the interpretation and one may say the Hegelian heresy of Croce) does not limit the objectivity and fairness of his account—a singular example of the breadth and width of culture overcoming personal preferences and one-sided points of view.

The book is even better than the author's own criteria of analysis. He states (*e.g.*, p. 103) that he means to follow *both* the genesis of Hegel's system in Hegel's own mind *and* the systematic or logical order of Hegel's ideas—and one does not see how an exposition may be made to follow two different lines which moreover belong to two quite different conceptions of the history of philosophy. The first one implies indeed that a philosophy is the result of a psychological process; the second one that there is an internal logical necessity which rules any philosophical system above and beyond the thinker's personal inclinations and spiritual peculiarities. And in fact (one might add, fortunately) Professor De Ruggiero does not follow his own criterion: the genetic explanation is used up to and inclusive of Hegel's philosophy in its first shape (that of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*) while the following chapters analyze his mature philosophy, distinguishing not between successive steps of its evolution but its particular aspects. Anyway the difference between Hegel's *Phenomenology* and Hegel's *Encyclopedia* and *Logic* is thereby enhanced, and the reader is again confronted with the paramount problems of Hegelianism—what did Hegel really mean by "Idea"? nay, what did Hegel really mean to do, a theory of knowledge or a theory of being? is "Idea" something thought, or implying thought, or is "Idea" only another designation for "being" in general, which implies the general logical quality of the universe and is only a contracted re-statement of the famous slogan that everything rational is real and everything real is rational?

A solution of this dilemma would reach the ultimate depths of Hegel's philosophy—and of contemporary history because on this dilemma depends the meaning of "dialectic." If indeed the dialectical movement is due to thought which can not rest on any affirmation because it can posit something only by positing its contrary too, thought and consciousness are presuppositions of the Idea and can not be considered as a result of its development. If the Idea is a being, awareness and self-awareness can be only moments of the dialectical movement—and then the problem is whether Idea can really be called "Idea," i.e., whether it has really, in its innermost core, something to do with "rational" and with "ideal."

One can not fail to see that in the first case Marxism and its materialistic conception of history would not have a *locus standi;* that in the second case the dialectical movement lacks any sufficient reason—if we don't mean to hypostatize dialectic as an absolute essence which lacks any reasonable justification or explanation.

Professor De Ruggiero follows the more recent trend of Hegelian criticism in Italy which developed the implications of Dilthey's research into the genesis of Hegel's philosophy and so came to give a paramount importance to the *Phenomenology.* The genetic method implies that the *Logic* too had to be explained as a development of the *Phenomenology,* and therefore in the analysis of the *Logic* there remains always something of the "theory of knowledge" aspect of the *Phenomenology.* In fact many modern critics, especially in Italy, never seemed to understand that Hegel, at least sometimes, meant to give a general theory *of being*—and this Italian preference can easily be referred to the influence of Croce whose theory practically eliminated ontologism by restricting his analysis to the Spirit, i.e., to the conscious moment of the Idea.

One must admit that the confusion between Idea as being and Spirit as thought is inherent in Hegel's philosophy. And this is due to the fundamental bent of modern philosophy which starting from Descartes and his distinction between matter and thought can never reach a satisfactory account of being as a unity of all possible kinds of being, of material and conscious being. Only by discarding Descartes, i.e., by going back to ancient and medieval philosophy, can we connect being and thinking, Idea and Spirit, in a coherent whole.

Professor De Ruggiero seems to feel (p. 120) the contrast and the difficulty to which is due that confusion between genetic and systematic analysis we described above. And his discarding the problem by saying that "one should anyway begin somewhere" does not seem a proper way of dealing with a paramount problem not only of Hegelian criticism but of the intimate content of philosophy. By "starting somewhere" one can never avoid explaining Hegel's philosophy either as a theory of knowledge *or* as a theory of being—without any hope of blending both sides into a coherent whole.

On the other hand the genetic method applied by Professor De Ruggiero to the *phenomenology* stage of Hegelianism enables us to see the religious origins of Hegel's thought and of the very idea of a dialectic development which seems to have been excogitated at first to account for the rise of Christianity out of the contradiction between Greek and Hebraic modes of thought and life. This is really the basic source of dialectic, and it proves that Hegel's thought was preconceived from the very beginning because he assumed that the

contrast had been really eliminated, instead of remaining in the very context of Christian dogma as it appears, for instance, in the parallel affirmation of the immortality *of the soul* and the resurrection *of the body*.

Anyway this religious (if mistaken) starting point of Hegel's train of thought, which led to such all-embracing results, proves that Feuerbach's religious interpretation of Hegelianism was at bottom justified. And as from Feuerbach to Marx there is an unbroken line of derivation, it may be safely concluded that the so-called "Hegelian left" and historical materialism had their source in the very core of Hegel's philosophy and may be referred to the basic preconception of Hegel about Christianity. In a sense Hegelianism is another Christian heresy (or its development) and Marxism only a special school of this heresy.

MARIO M. ROSSI

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

BOOK NOTE

Freedom of the Press: a Framework of Principle. WILLIAM E. HOCKING. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1947. xi + 243 pp. $3.00.

This volume is the first of six supplementary studies to the General Report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press published under the title, *A Free and Responsible Press.* It will be recalled that this Commission, headed by President Hutchins, reported upon the condition and problems of a free press in the contemporary world of mass communication. Part of the report, the "Summary of Principles" (reprinted in the volume under review), outlined the consensus of the committee on the fundamental principles of a free press. In *Freedom of the Press,* Professor Hocking presents an expanded treatment of these principles.

The expansion consists of a more careful attention to the logic, the detail, and the interconnection of the principles than could be given in a general summary; it has little in the way of new content, but those familiar with Professor Hocking's philosophy of law, society, and value will recognize its presence here. Unfortunately, the underlying grounds of the principles of freedom stated, the metaphysics of value, are not given extended treatment. The reasons for this are probably twofold; it is not written primarily for a technically equipped audience, and though the other members of the committee are committed only to the statement of general principles, Professor Hocking did not wish to push too far presuppositions

which other members had not accepted. One wishes that he had been able to give more consideration to these basic issues, for as it stands there is a kind of polite dogmatism about their statement. For example, the separation of the value of freedom from its character as a right is not so much explained or argued as asserted and the priority of duty to right and the priority of both to the state are eliptically treated.

In his discussion of the principle of limitation that circumscribes the exercise of freedom, a crucial doctrine in any theory of freedom, Professor Hocking rejects Mill's doctrine that the claim to liberty rests upon the pragmatic grounds of the large balance of social advantage over social harm resulting from free expression. He rejects it because the principle of limitation that results is subject to abuse by whosoever has the power of determining where in any given case the balance falls. Instead, Professor Hocking locates the ground of freedom in the "non-political duties" of the individual. The condition of forfeiture of freedom is derived from this. The right of free expression is forfeited when the duties which are its grounds are repudiated in the exercise of the freedom. This is a broader and more inclusive formulation of the principle that liberty of speech is properly denied those who, if empowered, would deny the principle of free speech.

Whatever the advantages of Professor Hocking's formulation, it should be recognized that it can not escape the criticism urged against Mill. It does not prevent debilitating casuistry either in determining what the non-political duties are or in determining whether by action or otherwise those duties have been repudiated by those asserting the right of free speech. This failure in operation is certainly not peculiar to the principles Professor Hocking employs, but the comment is worth making because the author sometimes seems to imply otherwise, despite his frequently explicit recognition of the variability of meaning and application of the principle in different contexts.

Just how variable it is becomes disappointingly clear in the concluding chapter where the author, reflecting the opinion of the Committee, "admits" the need to restrict freedom of the press for those who would press revolutionary ("demagogic") proposals upon an economically oppressed and therefore misguided and confused population. The essentially conservative fear of radical change emerges at the end to justify restrictions when freedom of speech and press is most in need of protection.

Despite the shortcomings indicated, this is an exceptionally fine book. It is especially well written; it is clear, forceful, free of jargon, and unstrained. It is, moreover, delightfully sprinkled

with comments by other members of the Committee objecting to, modifying, or amplifying what has been said in the text.

E. N. G.

CURRENT JOURNALS

MIND. Vol. LVII, No. 226. Whitehead and Principia Mathematica: *Bertrand Russell.* Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947): *C. D. Broad.* Professor H. A. Prichard. Personal Recollections: *E. F. Carritt.* Boole and the Revival of Logic: *William Kneale.* Can God's Existence be Disproved? *J. N. Findlay.* Necessary Propositions and Entailment-Statements: *P. F. Strawson.* Mental Acts: *A. C. Ewing.* Discussions—Does Aristotle Have a Doctrine of Secondary Substances? *David Sachs.* Induction and the Future: *Donald Williams.* Nowell-Smith on Retribution and Responsibility: *C. H. Whiteley.* Facts and Entailment: *E. Toms.*

REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS. Vol. 1, No. 3. The Criterion of Reality: *W. H. Sheldon.* The Status and Nature of Essences: *Abner Shimony.* Existentialism Old and New: *John Wild.*

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Volume IX, Number 2. Condorcet: *Alexandre Koyré.* Quesnay and Physiocracy: *T. P. Neill.* The Second Reform Movement in Britain 1850–1865: *F. H. Herrick.* E. L. Youmans: A Chapter in the Diffusion of Science in America: *C. M. Haar.* *Sinism:*—A Historical Critique: *M. T. Price.* Review of Northrop's *Meeting of East and West: Alburey Castell.*

BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 41e Année, No. 2. L'intuitivisme. Exposé: *Nicolas Lossky.* Discussion: MM. Bayer, Brehier, Lavelle, A. Leroy, Lossky, Salzi, Wahl.

ALFEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE. 40e Jaargang, Aflevering 3. Taal en teken in de wiskunde: *A. Heyting.* De Waarheid als Waarde van het Taalleven: *L. Van Haecht.* Kleine dialoog over de macht: *R. F. Beerling.* Het probleem der gelijktijdi gheid: *C. Alkemade.* De aesthetische houding: *D. Bartling.*

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. No. 146. Le problème du mal: *Henri Germond.* La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne: *René Schaerer.* La 42e séance annuelle de la Société romande de philosophie (juin, 1947): *Henri Reverdin.* Simple questions relatives à la notion chrétienne du temps: *Maurice Neeser.*

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. Vol. XXV, No. 4. The Goal of Unesco: *Jacques Maritain.* Two Contemporary Philosophers and

the Concept of Being: *Sister M. Elizabeth.* The Meaning of *Cogitatio* in St. Augustine: *R. G. Gassert.*

SAPIENTIA. Año 3, Núm. 7. Realismo intelectualista o irracionalismo caótico: *La Dirrección.* El desarrollo histórico de la filosofía y lógica medioevales del lenguaje: *M. Grabmann.* F. H. Jacobi y la filosofía: *R. Paniker.* Humanismo moderno y humanismo cristiano: *R. Fuentes Castellanos.*

NOTES AND NEWS

The following communication has reached us from Dr. G. Schischkoff, secretary of the Congress of Philosophy to be held at the University of Mainz, Germany, August 1–8, 1948. "We anticipate that the Congress will be conducted as far as possible on an international basis in order that German philosophers may have the opportunity of meeting foreign colleagues and of emerging from the one-sided and peculiarly German modes of thinking which have prevailed in years past. The promotion of the Congress and the entrance of invited foreign guests are being generously supported by the French military authorities. Our Congress closes several days before the beginning of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam in order that guests from abroad may have the opportunity of combining their participation in the Amsterdam Congress with a brief stay in Germany. It is of the greatest importance for us that our desire to have close contact with foreign colleagues in this Congress be given timely publicity." The address of Dr. Schischkoff is Am Kochelsee, Obb (13b), Schlehdorf, Germany.

A report of a similar Congress held last year in Garmisch-Parlenkuchen, September 2–8, 1947, has been prepared by Dr. Heinz-Matzat of Munich. It was published in the *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,* Bd. II, Heft 2–3. Those who wish to purchase reprints should address Dr. Schischkoff.

The First Brazilian Congress of Philosophy will be held at Belo-Horizonte, Brazil, July 19–24, 1948. Information may be obtained from the Committee at "Faculdade de Filosofia," Belo-Horizonte, Minas-Gerais, Brazil.